eurofascism.info

Hear the political upholders
how they pray, those beggars, for an extra vote!
Soon they’ll fold again,
nod and flipflop in the parliament!
They’ll catch each other’s fleas again,
and the Lion1 will let itself be caged
by the guild of politics.
the red ones, the yellow and the blue
the black ones too
do nothing but yawning
tame, submissive, bent

(Ward Hermans, Flemish nationalist writer, 1979 *)

As Stanley G. Payne points out in his comprehensive «A History of Fascism 1914-1945», fascism «remains probably the vaguest of the major political terms. This may stem from the fact that the word itself contains no explicit political reference, however abstract, as do democracy, liberalism, socialism and communism. To say that the Italian fascio means ‘bundle’ or ‘union’ does not tell us much».

From there, Payne goes on trying to find a working definition. Drawing on other leading scholars, he writes of the ideology and goals of fascism, which include «an esposular of an idealist, vitalist and voluntaristic philosophy, normally involving the attempt to realize a new modern, self-determined, and secular culture», the idea of creating «a new nationalist authoritarian state not based on traditional principles or models», a positive evaluation of and use of, or willingness to use, violence and war, and the goal of empire, expansion, or a radical change in a nation’s relationship with other powers.

Furthermore, Payne notes, fascism is anticonservative, anticommunist and antiliberal, has an extreme stress on the masculine principle and on male dominance and a tendency towards an authoritarian, charismatic, personal style of command.

As Payne himself notes his description of fascism is meant «as an analytic device for purposes of comparative analysis and definition» and «does not propose to establish a rigidly reified category but a wide-spectrum description that can identify a variety of differing allegedly fascist movements while still setting them apart as a group from other kinds of revolutionary or nationalist movements». Payne also notes that what he is attempting is to «arrive at a criterial definition applicable to all the interwar fascist movements sensu stricto».

Much of the material available on the fascist ideology, and much of the research done within this field of comparative political science, has the same focus as Payne’s book: the time period between 1914 and 1945.

The problem with this approach is that easily lets some fascists of the hook. Fascism did not die with Hitler in his bunker, and it was not buried with the fall of the Third Reich. One of the major variants of fascism described by Payne is Falangism, which – although competing with other kinds of authoritarian nationalism under Franco’s rule – remained influential in Spain until the dictator’s death in 1975 and still is represented by some minor political groups today. In Portugal, a variant of authoritarian nationalism sharing many attributes with fascism remained in power until 1974.

In a number of other European countries fascism also continued to exist and to develop.

«As the most distinctive new radicalism of the century» notes Payne, «fascism had left a seemingly permanent, if very limited, cultural residue. Thus even more fascist and right radical grouplets and organisations have appeared during the past half century than in the so-called era of fascism between the wars».

Today, some of these grouplets have grown into influential party organisations.

If it looks like a duck, swims like a duck and quacks like a duck, then it’s probably a duck, the proverb goes. But today’s ducks are not necessarily obsessed with male dominance, and they might even call themselves liberals or conservatives. To the degree that they were present, old dreams of empire building have largely faded away, being replaced by inwardly-looking politics strongly opposed to the foreign.

Much has changed. Some ducks will even insist that they are in fact geese, or even beautifully singing nightingales – the only ones who dare to speak the truth in the face of multiculturalism, a multiculturalism they will claim is totalitarian itself.

Only in the epilogue of his impressive summae on the subject of fascism, Payne discusses post-WWII fascism. While drawing the lines between neo-fascist and other right radical groups in a different manner than the author of this book does, he delivers a clear and thorough analysis here as elsewhere.

He also points out something that has only become increasingly obvious in the years that have passed since «A history of fascism» was published:

Even among the more genuinely neofascist groups, there are a number of differences from the historic movements. One is that the «myth of Europe» coexists with the nationalist myth to offer a new concept of transcendence for a broader, more interdependent world. Neofascism has more often than not been «Eurofascism», not in the sense of being moderate and parliamentary, as in so-called Eurocommunism, but in the sense of a fundamental appeal to the myth of «Aryan Europe» or some other definition of the ideal European identity as a basic frame of reference.

This appeal to such a European myth is also one of the reasons I have chosen Eurofascism as a term and as a title for this book. In addition, I have chosen to use this term to underscore the mostly European nature of the phenomenon I am describing. I use the term to refer to modern-day European parties characterised by:

• Historical and current ties to pre-WWII fascist parties, neo-Nazi groups, openly neo-fascist movements, Holocaust deniers and similar groups.
• Xenophobia or extreme opposition to immigration, often including the notion that one’s own group is being victimised.
• Strong focus on the ‘nation’, on ‘ethnicity’ and in some cases also on race.
• An understanding of a certain European unity, mostly expressed in the division into Europeans and non-Europeans (or in Westerners and non-Westerners).

The term Eurofascism is also meant to express the historical background of this modern-day nativist movement. However, not every fascist or pseudo-fascist movement in today’s Europe is included. For instance, a number of radical religious groups, Islamist ones amongst them, are not – although they could be considered both European and fascist.

Fascism has developed in quite different ways in Europe and in other countries around the world. In the United States it comes in a variety of forms, including the American Nazi Party, various offshoots of the Ku Klux Klan, the National Socialist Movement and a number of white power skinhead groups.

Parts of the Christian hard right might also be described as such, and seemingly more mainstream groups, such as the Liberty Lobby, has been part of the neo-fascist movement in America. So has the Institute for Historical Review, which – while describing itself as a «public interest educational, research and publishing center dedicated to promoting greater public awareness of history, and especially socially-politically relevant aspects of twentieth century history» – is little but a centre for the advancement of Holocaust denial.

South Africa also has its neo-fascist scene. A group calling itself the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging, saw the government of B.J. Vorster as «too left-wing». Vorster himself was a former ‘general’ in the Anti-British paramilitary group Stormjaers of the 1930s and 1940s, but that was not enough for the AWB, which rallied against softening the apartheid laws throughout the 1970s and 80s. The group survives to present day. In the wake of apartheid it clashed violently with South African police in the Battle of Ventersdorp 9. August 1991 **.

On its website, it describes itself as «fearless, Christian and unashamedly nationalistic [...] the new rightist – antithesis to the ANC – battlement for its people – bulwark against liberalism, Marxism and communism».

AWB has also been publishing a newsletter called Storm. In a 2002 issue of the newsletter it is claimed that Jews were involved in the 911 terror attacks:

The American Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), believes that Israeli intelligence could be responsible for or deeply involved in the tragedy of the World Trade Centre of the 11th September 2001. This is according to an American journalist, Jim Galloway, whose article was printed in the Atlanta Journal-Constitution and The Austin American-Statement 25. November 2001. Of the 1.100 foreigners that have been arrested by the FBI in connection with the 11. September slaughter, close to a hundred are Jews.***

Although it is not genuinely Eurofascist in its thinking or approach, a little-reported part of AWB’s story is its connection to European neo-fascists.

According to Martin A. Lee, there was «extensive contact between German neo-Nazis who had fought in Croatia and members of the Afrikaner Resistance Movement». Flemish nationalists, who have traditionally seen the Boers as «stamgenoten» (belonging to the same tribe), were reputedly involved in weapon transactions meant for the AWB. Some sources claim that weapons were transferred in a pub in Roeselare, Belgium, and that the Flemish nationalist Roger Spinnewijn were amongst those present. While Belgian police did look into the matter without finding any evidence for illegal weapon trade, Spinnewijn was convicted for illegally possessing a weapon.

In Latin America fascism has been represented by groups such as the Falange Socialista Boliviana – a party founded in the 1930s and initially close to Spanish falangism – or the more recent Partido del Nuevo Triunfo **** in Argentina. In Iran, the party Hezb-e Sosialist-e Melli-ye Kargaran-e Iran (Sumka) was founded in 1952. In Japan, too, one can find self-declared fascists to this very day.

Many of these movements are not merely fascist, but openly fascist and quite often openly Nazi, to such a degree that they include «National Socialist» or «Nazi» in their official names.

Many use symbols that are easily recognisable and often very similar to the symbols of the German NSDAP. The National Front of New Zealand, for instance, uses the Hitler Salute and quite openly endorses classical Nazi viewpoints.

There are – of course – a number of groups in Europe that do the same, such as the Norwegian Nazi Odinist cult Vigrid which is openly enthusiastic about the Waffen SS and also publishes much of Adolf Hitler’s artwork (!) on their webpage. As the climate of European politics changes these groups have to a certain degree been gaining support, but they remain miniscule and sometimes parodical. They are European fascists, but they are not Eurofascists as discussed in this book.

Most Eurofascists are neither expressing open support of fascism as an ideology nor calling themselves «fascist». Eurofascism is not openly revolutionary, and the guise of national conservatism or paleo-conservatism is often used.

The Brussels Journal, a web newspaper with considerable readership in nationalist and anti-Islamic circles, is often seen as a «conservative» voice, although it has featured articles portraying Muslim immigration as «the rape of Europe» and Turkish voters in the Netherlands as a «Trojan horse».

The webzine itself claims to «defend freedom» and to «strive to acquire as much knowledge as possible by presenting facts and views that are hard to find in the ‘consensus-media’ of Europe».

According to its webpages, its contributors «all write with an earnest desire for the truth» and what binds them together is their «defence of liberty and the conviction that the state exists to serve man and never the other way round».

One of its contributors is somewhat of a celebrity in certain parts of the blogosphere, the Norwegian essayist Fjordman. In an article called «How the West Was Lost», published in the Brussels Journal he writes:

The democratic states of the West are losing the ability to protect their citizenry, and are in some cases turning into enemies of their own people. That is a situation that cannot and will not last forever.

He goes on to say that if this is allowed to continue, it might have consequences «most of us» would not like to contemplate. A few months later, in what he refers to as a European Declaration of Independence, he reveals that he might have contemplated it anyway (*x):

If these demands are not fully implemented, if the European Union isn’t dismantled, Multiculturalism isn’t rejected and Muslim immigration isn’t stopped, we, the peoples of Europe, are left with no other choice than to conclude that our authorities have abandoned us, and that the taxes they collect are therefore unjust and that the laws that are passed without our consent are illegitimate. We will stop paying taxes and take the appropriate measures to protect our own security and ensure our
national survival.

Another difference between the old-time fascism some marginal American groups still cling to and modern-day Eurofascism is the fact the latter does not rely on physical violence.

This does not mean that violence is never taken in use, nor does it change the fact that xenophobic violence follows in the wake of Eurofascism. Indeed, Eurofascism has a tendency to see violence against immigrants as understandable or even commendable, and ties with militant groups are highly present.

A Eurofascist calls himself a «nationalist», or a «national democrat», sometimes simply a «patriot». Eurofascism wraps itself in the flag, and believes in the primacy of the group represented by that flag, whether French, British, Flemish or Swedish. It also sees its own group as a victim of internal and
external enemies alike. It dreads the group’s decline under the corrosive effect of alien influences.

Eurofascism, like classical fascism, brands its opponents as traitors or cowards, and it usually scorns intellectuals, academics, media workers and artists. Eurofascism is hostile to leftist and labour movements, and is often longing for a mythic «better time» of the past. Eurofascism, like traditional European fascism, is obsessed with the idea of Europe being threathened and facing a crisis, «so
monumental in its reach and its consequences that we have to go back to the Migration Period to find anything similar» (*xx).

Unlike some of the traditional fascists which still remain active on the fringes of society, Eurofascists have learnt that if you dress yourself in a suit and a tie – and in the robes of conservatism rather than in boots and swastikas – you are much more likely to gain broad acceptance within stable democratic countries. This strategy is sometimes stated quite openly.

Footnotes:

* Quoted in Spruyt, Marc: «Wat het Vlaams Blok verzwijgt», 2000. Translated to English by the author of this book – the original in Flemish is as follows: Hoor de politieke pooiers! / Hoor ze bedelen, de schooiers, om en voorkeurstem! / Straks dan staan ze weer te plooien / te knikken en te flikkeflooien in het parlement / Vangen weer malkanders vlooien,/ En de Leeuw… die laat zich kooien / door de politieke bent; / Roje, gele, blauwe leeuwen, / Zwarte ook, doen niets dan geeuwen, / tam, gedwee, getemd. “The Lion” is a reference to the lion in the Flemish flag.

** Ventersdorp was a stronghold for the AWB and the home town of its leader, Eugene Terre’Blanche. When then state president F. W. De klerk was to speak at the town hall, armed AWB members confronted police lines. In the ensuing violence, a passerby and three AWB supporters were killed.

*** Translated from Afrikaans by the author.

**** The New Triumph Party. This party had «Una Nación, Un Pueblo, Un Lider» as a slogan, and was banned in 2004, by a federal judge who stated that their identification with the Hitler regime was unconstitutional. The party subsequently went underground.

*x Note that Fjordman has reacted to some of my articles on this subject by stating that he is not at all a fascist, but actually a democrat, and furthermore by hinting that the author of this book and others who criticise or disagree with Fjordman are the real totalitarians. As this is a critique that might be levelled also against this book, it should be pointed out that claiming to be a democrat hardly proves that you are. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the perhaps most totalitarian regime in the entire world, is an illustrating example of the opposite. This underscores the importance of setting a certain standard. Democrats do not speculate in whether democracy is «too soft to function», Fjordman does. Democrats do not threathen with taking undefined «appropriate measures» if democratically elected politicians do not listen to them. Fjordman does. Democrats do not speak of their democratically elected opponents as «collaborators» because they follow a different political course than what their own political sect – of mostly little electoral significance – wishes for. Fjordman does.

*xx This remark is oft repeaten on Internet forums etc. The person who I have chosen to quote is however, Gulbrand Oscar Johan Lunde, a member of the Norwegian Nazi party National Samling, speaking at Nytorget in Oslo, 26. June 1941. See this article in TIME Magazine from November 1942.